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ABSTRACT
We ask whether tax earmarking can foster accountability in public provision of goods
and services when consumers can privately monitor provision. We show that earmarking
can raise the stakes that consumers have in monitoring public provision independently
of how taxes are earmarked, because it introduces a more direct linkage between moni-
toring and taxes paid.
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1 Introduction
This note examines how tax earmarking aects the extent to which spending authorities are ac-
countable to taxpayers. Earlier literature on scal accountability has typically adopted a top-down
view of accountability, where spending agents are monitored by some higher-ranking institution
like a regulatory authority. Here we focus instead on a bottom-up notion of accountability, which
we could label `grass-roots accountability': monitoring of spending authorities by the nal users of
the publicly provided goods.
Buchanan's (1963) early contribution to the analysis of tax earmarking focused on its implica-
tions for scal choices under majority voting. Although later authors have studied dierent aspects
of tax earmarking, a potentially important dimension of it has so far been neglected, namely, the
linkage between tax earmarking and private monitoring of spending agencies by taxpayers. The
idea that private agents' involvement can play an important role in ensuring scal discipline has
been a recurring theme in the debate over government provision of services both in the Europe and
North-America, although it has received comparatively less attention in the theoretical literature;
the only paper we know of to explicitly look at this issue is Davis and Hayes (1993). In what
follows, we explicitly formalize this idea and explore its implications for tax earmarking.
We describe a model of scal choices where the spending agencies that are responsible for the
provision of public goods and services have private information about the costs they incur, and
where citizens can undertake costly monitoring whenever they receive goods and services from the
agency. We then characterize mixed-strategy equilibria of the resulting noncooperative game and
examine how they depend on the tax earmarking regime.
Our ndings show that earmarking certain taxes to certain uses can foster accountability of
spending authorities to taxpayers independently of the manner in which taxes and spending cat-
egories are matched. This is because, as long as private agents make dierential contributions
to dierent revenue sources (because of preference or endowment heterogeneity), earmarking can
reduce free-riding in private monitoring.
1
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 considers
the no-earmarking case, and Section 4 that of full earmarking. Section 5 compares the two and
concludes.
2 The Model
We model the eects of earmarked taxes by considering two agencies, denoted A and B, providing
1
It is well understood that institution design can help reduce free riding in private monitoring. Laont and Tirole
(1994, Chapter 15) discuss this idea in a model of regulatory capture, and show that the optimal pricing rule to be
adopted by the regulator may depend on whether or not the regulator is benevolent: with a self-interested regulator,
Average Cost Pricing regulation may outperform Marginal Cost Pricing regulation because it encourages consumers
to monitor the regulator. Our analysis can be viewed as an application of these ideas to the case of self-interested
government agencies providing public goods, with earmarking rules playing a role analogous to that played by pricing
rules in a regulatory context.
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two dierent public goods, to 2n consumers. Thus, good i 2 fA;Bg is produced by agency i,
combining a certain amount of labour inputs, e (eort by the agency), with other intermediate
inputs, r, according to technologies which can be represented by a concave production function
q(e; r; 
i
), where 
i
represents a factor-neutral shift parameter. The possible input combinations
needed to produce a unit of the good A can be represented by a unit isoquant described by the
condition q(e; r; 
i
) = 1. For the purposes of our analysis, it is convenient to represent substitution
possibilities between the two inputs by means of functions e(r; 
i
) and r(e; 
i
), both increasing in

i
and decreasing respectively in r and e. Technologies are subject to random exogenous shocks
which are modelled as shifts in 
i
, and are assumed to be independent and uncorrelated across
agencies. We assume that there are only two possible realizations:  and , with  > , occurring
with probabilities respectively equal to  and  = 1    (the same possible lotteries on outcomes
are assumed for both agencies) .
Each agency is viewed as being composed of bureaucrats who are paid a xed salaryW to exert
an eort equal to unity, and who have private information about cost conditions. If an agency
reveals the true state of technologies, it will be required to exert an eort equal to one, which
involves using an amount r(1; 
i
) of inputs, with i 2 fA;Bg. If agency i misrepresents the true
technological conditions when 
i
= , it will be able to employ an amount of inputs equal to r(1; )
and reduce its eort to e(r(1; ); ) < e(r(1; ); ) = 1, while if the misrepresentation occurs when

i
= , eort will increase to e(r(); ) > e(r(); ) = 1. The cost of the publicly provided good thus
depends on the realization of the state and on whether or not the agency \lies". In the following,
we shall denote by 
i
(
i
) 2 f0; 1g the agency's reporting strategy, with (
i
) = 0 if the agency tells
the truth and 
i
(
i
) = 1 if it lies. We shall also make use of the shorthand R(
i
)  r(1; 
i
).
Although information about costs is private, individual citizens can undertake costly monitoring
of the local agencies eort whenever they receive goods and services. The idea here is that the
public have an opportunity to directly observe bureaucratic performance and have channels that
they can use to censor abuses (such as formal complaints or other forms of legal or politically
relevant actions). If any of the citizens decides to monitor the agency and the agency has lied
about cost conditions, the true state will be uncovered with certainty, and the agency will be forced
to exert an eort equal to 1 and incur a penalty F .
Let us denote by 
i
h
2 f0; 1g, h 2 f1; : : : ; 2ng, citizen h's monitoring choice, with 
i
h
= 1
representing the choice to monitor agency i by a citizen h and 
i
h
= 0 the choice not to monitor;
also, let ~
i
denote the prole of consumers' monitoring choices with respect to agency i. Then, the
cost of public good provision by agency i, denoted as c
i
, depends on technological conditions and
on the strategies of both the agency and the citizens:
c
i
(
i
; 
i
(
i
); ~
A
) W +
 
1  (1   
i
(~
i
))
i
(
i
)

R(
i
) + (1   
i
(~
i
))
i
(
i
)R(
^

i
);
i 2 fA;Bg; (1)
where  
i
(~
i
)  1I
P
h

i
h
>0
is an index function which takes a value of 1 whenever
P
h

i
h
> 0, i.e.
when at least one citizen monitors, and is zero otherwise.
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Monitoring is costly for consumers. Consumers are endowed with a certain amount of time
which they can either sell on the labour market at a given wage rate or use for monitoring an
agency (or both agencies). We shall denote with Y potential before-tax income, and with M the
opportunity cost (in terms of foregone earnings) of monitoring one agency. The monitoring cost
increases to 2M if the consumer decides to monitor both agencies.
The agencies' services are paid for by consumer taxes, which may or may not be earmarked to a
specic agency. Taxes are anonymous, but can aect dierent individuals dierentially because of
their dierent consumption patterns: a tax on cigarettes is only paid by smokers (if one abstracts
from general equilibrium eects) and a tax on fuel is only paid by car users. Here, we shall make
the extreme assumption that there exist two separate consumer types, 1 and 2, each consisting of n
individuals, each buying a private good|completely unrelated to the public goods supplied by the
agencies|in a xed amount equal to unity: type-1 consumers consume private good 1 on which a
unit tax at rate t
1
is levied, and type-2 consumers consume private good 2 and pay a unit tax t
2
.
2
If tax revenues are not earmarked, then the total cost of providing the public goods is nanced
by the sum of the revenues from each tax. If we let t
1
= t
2
 t, then the tax required will be
t
NE
1
(c
A
; c
B
) = t
NE
2
(c
A
; c
B
) = t
NE
(c
A
; c
B
) =
c
A
+ c
B
2n
: (2)
Earmarking of taxes can be achieved by instituting a link between a specic tax revenue ow and
a certain agency. Suppose, arbitrarily, that the cost of provision incurred by agency A is nanced
by taxes on good 1, with the cost for B being nanced by taxes on good 2. Then we have
t
E
1
(c
A
; c
B
) =
c
A
n
; t
E
2
(c
A
; c
B
) =
c
B
n
:
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(3)
Denote the payo of a representative type-j (j 2 f1; 2g) consumer k 2 f1; : : : ; ng as Z
j
k
. Then,
Z
j
k
(
A
; 
B
;
A
(
A
); 
B
(
B
);
A
k
; 
B
k
; ~
A
 k
; ~
B
 k
) 
U
 
Y   
A
k
M   
B
k
M   t
j
(c
A
(
A
; 
A
(
A
); ~
A
); c
B
(
B
; 
B
(
B
); ~
B
))

; j 2 f1; 2g; (4)
where ~
i
 h
, i 2 fA;Bg are the monitoring choices of all consumers except h, and U denotes utility.
Note that in this formulation citizens do not directly gain from the application of the penalty
if misrepresentation by the agency is discovered: the benet of monitoring for the citizens only
consists of potential cost savings which result in lower taxes. Throughout our analysis we shall
assume risk-neutral citizens, i.e. U(Y ) = Y .
4
2
There is no reason to restrict the number of consumer types to two, to assume that each consumer type is only
aected by a single tax (typically individuals are aected by all taxes), or to assume consumption to be independent
of level of taxation, except that this simplied specication is convenient and suÆcient to develop our argument.
Clearly, tax earmarking raises distributional considerations, which are not captured by our symmetric treatment of
consumers and which would come into play in a more realistic model.
4
Adopting a more general utility function allowing for risk aversion would introduce a tradeo between insurance
and monitoring incentives, which is not essential to our argument.
3
Each agency's payo only depends on the state and strategies directly aecting it, and can be
expressed as
L
i
(
i
; 
i
(
i
); ~
i
) 
W  

1  (1   
i
(~
i
))
i
(
i
)(1  e(R(
^

i
); 
i
))

v    
i
(~
i
)
i
(
i
)F; i 2 fA;Bg; (5)
where v the constant marginal valuation of eort. For the agency, misrepresenting cost conditions
involves a change in eort and the prospect a penalty F if monitoring occurs.
5
In the unfavourable
state ( = ), telling the truth will always be a dominant strategy for the agency, since it results in
lower eort and no penalty; hence in the remainder of our discussion we shall take () = 0. But,
in the favourable state ( = ), the agency will have an incentive to misrepresent cost conditions in
order to reduce eort, which it will have to weigh against the potential penalty it faces if monitoring
takes place.
The citizens and the agencies play an `inspection game' (Laont and Tirole, 1994) where the
agencies announce their cost conditions and, simultaneously,
6
consumers decide whether or not to
monitor the agencies. In this game, each agency can adopt a mixed strategy, whereby it cheats
(misrepresent cost) with probability q
i
and does not cheat with probability 1   q
i
. Each citizen
can similarly mix between monitoring and not monitoring either or both agencies. The monitoring
probabilities of the citizens are denoted as p
i
h
, with i 2 fA;Bg; and h 2 f1; : : : ; 2ng: Pure- or fully
mixed-strategy equilibria can arise in this game, depending on parameter values.
3 No Earmarking
We shall begin by considering rst the no-earmarking case. A consumer has four possible actions,
to monitor one of A or B, monitor both agencies, or monitor neither. Note that there will never
be pure-strategy equilibria where any of the citizens monitors an agency with probability one:
if monitored with certainty, an agency would choose never to cheat, which in turn implies that
monitoring all the time could not be an equilibrium best response. Hence, the only possible pure-
strategy equilibrium involves all citizens choosing never to monitor and both agencies cheating:
5
For expositional convenience we assume that the penalty is incurred whenever the agency lies, whatever the state.
It may seem incongruous to punish the agency for exerting extra eort when  = ; as we shall see, however, the
agency never lies in this case, independently of whether or not a penalty is applied, and therefore this assumption is
fully innocuous.
6
Wemodel the game as simultaneous rather than sequential for simplicity. They key feature here is that monitoring
by citizens encourages agencies to be more eÆcient. Sequentiality would not add much to this basic incentive
structure, other than the ability by consumers to compare announcements across dierent agencies and update their
priors accordingly.
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Proposition 1: There exists a (symmetric) pure-strategy Nash equilibrium which involves all cit-
izens choosing not to monitor and all agencies cheating i
M >
(   )
2n
: (6)
Proof: Consider consumer h. Given p
i
s
= 0;8s 6= h, i 2 fA;Bg, and q
A
= q
B
= 1; consumer h
would choose not to monitor, given that no other consumer monitors, if and only if the expected
utility from monitoring an agency{which equals Y  M   ((1 + ) + )=(2n)|is less than that
from not monitoring it|which equals Y   =n; this implies condition (6) above. 
Such a pure-strategy equilibrium will only prevail in situations where monitoring costs are
too high from the point of view of individual consumers for monitoring to be worthwhile, and is
therefore not very interesting. Note that, for a given M , the right-hand side of (6) is decreasing
in n, which implies that private monitoring can only be observed if group size is not \too large",
and is therefore more relevant for situations where the number of taxpayers is relatively small, as
in the case of local agencies providing goods paid for by local taxes.
IfM < ( )=(2n) and there are no symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, by the Nash existence
theorem there will exist a symmetric-mixed strategy (Bayesian) equilibrium in which the consumers
randomize between inspecting and not inspecting and the agency always announces the truth when
 =  and lies with some probability when  = . Let

 
(1  )v
F + (1  )v
< 1: (7)
Then, we can characterize symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria as follows:
Proposition 2: A mixed-strategy equilibrium with no earmarking has
p
A
h
= p
B
h
= p
NE
= 1  (1  
)
1=(2n)
; (8)
and
q
A
= q
B
= q
NE
=
2M(1  
)
1=(2n)
(1  
)(   )
: (9)
Proof: In a fully-mixed equilibrium, each agency, when facing a favourable cost realization, must
be indierent between telling the truth and lying. Let ~p represent the prole of consumers' mixed
strategies, and ~p
 h
the vector of mixing probabilities of all citizens except h. When  = , the
expected payo for an agency i as a function of her reporting strategy 
i
() is given by the ex-
pectation E(L
i
(; 
i
(); ~
i
) j ~p )  (
i
(); ~p ). Indierence between truthfully reporting costs and
lying requires
(1; ~p ) = (0; ~p ); i 2 fA;Bg: (10)
Because of risk neutrality and of the fact that monitoring costs are linear in the number of
agencies monitored, the expected payo from any strategy combination (
A
h
; 
B
h
) to any citizen
5
h is additively separable across agencies. Thus, in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium we
can simply require that a consumer be indierent between never monitoring a certain agency i
and monitoring it with probability one, given the strategies of all other players. Suppose then
that a consumer monitors A with probability p
A
h
. Consumer h's expected payo as a func-
tion of her monitoring choice 
B
h
with respect to agency B is then given by the expectation
E(Z
h
(
A
; 
B
;
A
(
A
); 
B
(
B
);
A
h
; 
B
h
; ~
A
 h
; ~
B
 h
) j ; ; q
A
; q
B
; ~p
 h
; p
A
h
)  	(
B
h
; q
A
; q
B
; ~p
 h
; p
A
h
). In-
dierence requires
	(1; q
A
; q
B
; ~p
 h
; p
A
h
) = 	(0; q
A
; q
B
; ~p
 h
; p
A
h
); h 2 f1; : : : ; 2ng: (11)
Substituting expressions (4), (5), and (2) into (10) and (11), and letting q
i
= q
NE
; i 2 fA;Bg,
and p
i
h
= p
NE
; h 2 f1; : : : ; 2ng; i 2 fA;Bg, gives conditions (8) and (9) above. 
Note that the equilibrium probability of monitoring is directly related to the savings in eort
from cheating{represented by (1   )v in 
|and inversely related to the penalty. The aggregate
monitoring eort, as measured by the probability of being monitored for an agency|which equals
1  (1  p
NE
)
2n
= (1  )v=(F + (1 )v)|is independent of the number of consumers involved.
The equilibrium probability of cheating, on the other hand, is inversely related to the number of
individuals (the denominator of (9) is decreasing in n). Thus, once the conditions for a mixed-
strategy equilibrium are met, free-riding incentives in monitoring are reected in the equilibrium
level of cheating.
3 Full Earmarking
With full earmarking, the taxes payable by a consumer only depend on the action of the agency
to which the revenues from such taxes are earmarked. Consider, for example, a consumer k 2
f1; : : : ; ng of type 1 whose taxes are earmarked to agency A. The choice to monitor both agencies
is clearly dominated by that of monitoring agency A only. The agencies thus face the same payos
as in the no earmarking case, except that now the number of consumers that can potentially monitor
any agency is now only n.
As in the no-earmarking case, we can determine an upper bound on M above which consumers
will never choose to monitor (the proof is analogous to that of Proposition 1):
Proposition 3: Under full tax earmarking, there exists a (symmetric) pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium which involves all citizens choosing not to monitor and all agencies cheating i
M >
(   )
n
: (12)
Note that (12) implies (6). Thus, if there is no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in the full
earmarking case, then there is not one in the no earmarking case either. Symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibria under full earmarking can be characterized as follows:
6
Proposition 4: When taxes are fully earmarked, the equilibrium probability of monitoring and of
cheating in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by
p
1A
k
= p
2B
k
= p
E
= 1  (1  
)
1=n
: (13)
and
q
A
= q
B
= q
E
=
M(1  
)
1=n
(1 
)(   )
: (14)
Proof: With full earmarking there are only two possible meaningful actions possible for a con-
sumer: she can either monitor the agency to which the taxes she pays are earmarked or not monitor
at all. Suppose that, arbitrarily, the revenues from taxes paid by type-1 consumers are earmarked to
agency A, with the same applying to type-2 consumers and agency B, and focus on the monitoring
choice of type-1 consumers. The expected payo for a representative consumer k 2 f1; : : : ; ng of
type 1 as a function of her monitoring choice with respect to agency A, and given that no type-1 con-
sumer will never monitorB, is given by the expectation E(Z
1
k
(
A
; 
B
;
A
(
A
); 
B
(
B
);
A
k
; 0; ~
A
 k
; ~
B
 k
) j
; ; q
A
; q
B
; (~p
1A
 k
;
~
0); (
~
0; ~p
2B
 k
)) 
^
	
1
(
1A
k
; q
A
; q
B
; (~p
1A
 k
;
~
0); (
~
0; ~p
2B
 k
)). Indierence requires
^
	
1
(1; q
A
; q
B
; ~p
 h
) =
^
	
1
(0; q
A
; q
B
; ~p
 h
); k 2 f1; : : : ; 2ng: (15)
The same applies to type-2 consumers with a change of indices.
Using (15) in conjunction with (10), substituting expressions (4), (5), and (3) into (10) and
(15), and letting q
i
= q
E
; i 2 fA;Bg, and p
1A
k
= p
2B
k
= p
E
; k 2 f1; : : : ; ng, gives conditions (13)
and (14) above. 
5 Comparison and Conclusions
We will now show that under our assumptions there will be an unambiguous decrease in cheating
when earmarking is used:
Proposition 5: Assume M < (   )=n. Then, the equilibrium probability of cheating by a
representative agency is less under full tax earmarking than with no earmarking, i.e. q
E
< q
NE
.
Proof: Comparing expressions (14) and (9), it is easily seen that q
NE
> q
E
requires 2(1 
)
1=2n
>
(1  
)
1=n
. Since (1  
) 2 (0; 1), this condition is always met. 
Tax earmarking thus provides a way of mitigating agency problems in public provision. More-
over, it should be stressed that the precise manner in which taxes are earmarked is totally immaterial
for it to be eective: in the model just described the tax base here is completely independent of
the goods and services publicly provided, and the assignment of tax bases to spending categories
is fully arbitrary. This means that, even when user charges are not available|as is the case with
health and education services in many countries|tax earmarking can still play a positive role in
fostering accountability, particularly with respect to local government agencies.
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